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SANDAY (India) 31 May-6 June 1998

By Soumen Datta/ Port Blair and Ne Delhi with Anish Gupta, and Sourabh Sen
Calcutta

'The Army Is Trying To Scupper a CBI Investigation Into "Operation Leeh" In The Andamans.' What Are They Try To Hide?

SUNDAY Investigate The Real Story

It was Quiet. It was precise. It was brutal. It was hell in the archipelago that will go down as the most astounding encounter staged by India's war machine. As a counterinsurgency operation, its build-up, maneuvers and subtle subterfuge had all the qualities of small-scale military offensive. Yet, in the end, not many of those who took part in this exercise-code-named "Operation Leech"-would perhaps like to cherish its memory, tainted as it may be by the blood of friends and the guilt that goes with betrayal. 

On 12 February, Maj. Gen. S.C. Chopra, additional direct-general, military operations, ministry of defense, told the press in New Delhi that India security forces had intercepted, on 11 February, a major gang of international gunrunners supplying weapons to different secessionist groups in the north-east. The story unfurled further in follow-ups that claimed that a joint operation mounted by the army, navy, air force and Coast Guards had successfully aborted a clandestine shipment of lethal weapons valued at around
US$ 1 million.

In the skirmish that ensued, six gunrunners were said to be have killed in an encounter-their bodies lost to the heaving sea-73 other arrested, four vessels impounded and huge cache of arms and ammunition recovered. The operation was apparently mounted following receipt of impeccable military intelligence about the movement of the smugglers. It was touted as the biggest seizure of the sophisticated weapons being landed on India territory since the Purulia Arms Drop in December 1995. For India's security personnel, it was yet another
feather in their already-crowed cap.

But is this the real story?

When SUNDAY reached Port Blair on 7 March, the authorities, including the army, navy, and the Coast Guard, were surprisingly tight-lipped about an incident that should normally have been trumpeted as a major success story.

The officialdom was extremely secretive, withholding information on the plea of safeguarding "national security interests".

The A&N headquarters was teeming with sleuths of every hue. Among the agencies that had flown in their topnotch officers were CBI, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), RAW, the Subsidiary Intelligence Branch (SIB), the Military Intelligence Unit (MIU) and SIT, each trying to prise out information. And SUNDAY sources within some of these agencies were hinting at a cover-up and rising unsavory questions. 

Were the arrested men, and those who were killed, professional gunrunners carrying arms for the north-east., or were they member of Arakan Army (AA), the military wing of National United Party of Arakan (NUPA), which is fighting the repressive Myanmarnese junta for separate Arakan state? Could they have been lured into a trap and stabbed in the back by the India authorities, who after propping them up to placate Myanmar's dictators in council?

 Preparation for the assault had begun several days in advance. From 3 February onward, the quietude of Landfall, an uninhabited island 250 km off Port Blair in the pristine Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) archipelago, was shattered by unprecedented flurry of activities.

Thee vessels-GGS Vivek. CGS Ganga Devi, CGS Lakhmibai-belonging to the Cost Guards, and two-LUC-33 and LUC-35-belonging to navy, had sailed from Port Blair.

Two other naval ships-INS Santvti, INS Vindhyagiri-brought in crack marine commandos (Marcos) and hardware from Visakhapatnam, headquarters of Eastern Naval Command. And all seven ships, with 180 sailors and officers, took up position in a line between Landfall and Narcondum Islands.

Five helicopters belonging to the air force (two MI-8s), navy (two MI-8s) and the Coast Guard (one Chetak) did sorties from Madras, Car Nicobar and the Brichgunj cantonment near Port Blair, ferrying in men and material.
Aircraft based at navel base INS Utkroh in Port Blair flew several sorties to Landfall and East Islands with a few army officers. Among them was Lt-Col.

A.J. Grewal, a military intelligence officer.  There is, however, confusion regarding his initials. Some say his name is P.S. Grewal, other seem to know him as Vijay Grewal. He is believed to have been born in Mayanmar and was in touch with Myanmarese military intelligence.

Lt.Col. Grewal, say intelligence sources, was the key man in this operation. They say he speaks Burmese fluently, and had apparently visited Myanmar and Thailand in January this year. That he did go to Bangkok has also been confirmed by SUNDAY's sources in NUPA from Arakan. By the time the sun went down on 9 February, everything was in place. The net had been perfectly laid to trap an approaching flotilla of four vessels-two speedboats and two fishing trawlers-that had already reached the vicinity of Narcondam Island, about 140 nautical miles from Landfall. And as night fell, the India armada waited.

One vision of what happened in the next 36 hours can be had from the FIR filed on 18 April-seven days after the incident by R.S. Dhankar, Lieutenant Commander, Deputy Naval Provost Marshal, for Fortress Commander, Commander A.S. Rai, A&N, with the station house officer, central crime section of the A&N Police.

It says: "Hard intelligence was received that a consignment of arms, ammunition and equipment was being brought by some foreign nationals to Landfall Island in trawlers/speed boats. They were reported to be of South East Asia n region. Intelligence sources intimated that the purpose of bringing the arms, ammunition, stores and equipment to Landfall Island was to subsequently trans-ship them illegally to terrorists/militant outfits in north eastern states of India via Cox Bazar in Bangladesh?

"A joint tri-services operation was lunched on 09 Feb 98 to apprehend the foreigners along with their arms, ammunition and equipment. Coast Guard ships and Police were also used in the operation. The operation progressed successfully and resulted in the capture of 73 foreign nationals?six foreign national tried to escape into the adjoining area while operating fire with their weapons on our troops. Our troops immediately responded in self defense and fatally injured six of them whilst in the water. They were seen disappearing in the sea and presumed dead. After a search none of the six bodies could be recovered."

Dhankar also stated that the 73 arrests men were to be handed to over (to the civil authority) at Camp Bell Bay, but requested that the "arms, ammunition and equipment" be allowed to be retained by the army/navy for further investigation. "The same," he declared, "will be produced as and when desired by the court."

Within days of the FIR, the Government of India (GOI) ordered a CBI probe. It was an open-and-shut case as far as the defense establishment was concerned. Some foreign nationals, abating terrorism in the north-east has been killed in an encounter, their accomplices arrested, and arms seized. The services had jointly acted on the basic of tip-offs given by military sources and had succeeded. And there, on that victorious note, the matter should have rested. Such encounter, in the interest of national security, are not unusual in Kashmir and even in the north-east. The CBI is rarely, if at all, asked to meddle in such cases.

But here, the OGI's decision to put the CBI on the trail seemed to suggest there was more to it than meet the eye. CBI sources say the Union home ministry asked them to investigate after the army's hush-hush attitude had fuelled speculation in the local press and had sent the A&N administration into a tizzy. 

On 12 February, newspapers in Port Blair carried reported of a joint anti-smuggling operation by the navy and the army the day before, but the A&N administration had been kept in the dark. And even though days passed, the civic administration wasn't informed, nor was any FIR field. Besides, the arrested men had neither been headed over to the police nor produced in court even three days after their arrest, when, by law, is mandatory to do so within 24 hours. 

Sources in Port Blair told SUNDAY that in order to cover its own back, the A&N administer pressured the fortress commander to file a case. A&N inspector-general of police Y.R. Dhuriya took a personal initiative to make the defense establishment conform to law.

The services complied on 18 February by formally filing an FIR and handing over the detained foreigners. But the arms, ammunition, and other hardware seized in the operation-which form vital part the body of evidence-were withheld. Only a list of materials was provided. 

Since then, it has a period of unbroken silence. Even three months after taking up the case, the CBI is nowhere near filling a chare-sheet against the detainees. In fact, they are likely to be set free by the court because of the
CBI's failure to frame charges within 90 days of their arrest. CBI sources in New Delhi told SUNDAY on condition of anonymity that the defense authorities have completely stonewalled the investigation by refusing
to cooperate.

More than three months after the incident, the seized weapons have not been handed over to the CBI despite several requests attempts to interrogate defense personnel who took part in the operation have been repeatedly blocked and relevant log books and papers sought by the investigators are yet to reach them. "The defense authorities are deliberately adopting dilatory tactics," complain CBI sources.

CBI officers even say that the deadlock has been refereed to the PMO but are special about being allowed to go the whole hog given the nature of the case. Its sensitivity can be gauged from the bulk of information so far gathered from the detained foreigners. And their version of what has happened on 9 February and after is completely different from the story contained in the defense FIR.

THERE was no encounter, the detainees have told the Andaman police in Port Blair. If anything, it was cold-blooded manslaughter. Their story began on the night of 8 February. They were members of the AA, which fighting Burmese ethnic domination and the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Myanmar's repressive military junta. The contingent also had a few members of AA the Karen National Army (KNA), an ally of the AA in its anti-junta fight. "I along with my leader told me, in Landfall Island, we have no problem. India government allow us all times," recounted one the detainees. There were 43 of them when they sailed out of the Thai waters in two speedboats laden with sophisticated arms. They were to briefly halt at Landfall and then proceed to be sent to their comrades in the Arakan hills. On their way to Landfall, they accosted and captured two Thai trawlers with 36 fishermen for refusing to pay a "routine tax" to the AA. Now, four boats,
with 79 men in all, sailed again, reaching Narcondum Island at 7 pm on 9 February. 

They were already aware of India ships stationed off Landfall Island. Ordinary poachers or smuggles would have fled immediately. But these boats waited, confidently. Khing Raza, a NUPA politburo member and commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army and leader of the mission, had once spoken to Saw tun, his number two, over the wireless before the boats reached Narcondum. In accordance with their plan, explain, explained the detainees, Saw Tun had already arrived at Landfall with India Army officers, who were there to receive the Arakanese boats. And now, from Narcondum, Khing Raza contacted Saw Tun again over the VHF, informing his deputy about his arrival. Nothing happened after that. "That night we slept near Narcondum Island," said one detainee. The next morning at 10 am the wireless crackled again. On the other end was Saw Tun calling from Landfall. He told Khin Raza that it was times to start for Landfall, and response to that beckoning call the flotilla weighed anchor.

The smaller speedboat, said to be fitted with Volvo engines capable of doing 35 knots per hour, surged ahead of the rest. It carried on doing board Khing Raza, and his close comrades Pado Mulway (in-charge of AA marine operation), Captain Myint Shwe (of Karen National Army) and Pho Cho, the vessel's pilot. When the speedboats, with trawlers in tow, boldly passed the through the cordon of naval ships and reached Landfall towards the evening the evening, they were warmly welcomed by a reception party that included among others Lt-Col. Grewal. Apparently, there was much handshaking and embracing. Five bottles of rum were produced and toasted raised a small camp site was cleared food was arranged and there was merrymaking around the campfire that night. That very evening, they were asked to display their weapons. The request did not strike them as ominous or even fishy. The arms were unloaded from the speedboats and laid on the shore in full vies of the Indian armymen.

At 8am on 11 February, an India naval ship was seen taking up position close to Landfall Island. The unsuspecting Arakanese solders were told in Myanmarese that an Indian leader would soon arrive by helicopter and breakfast would be "taken together" once he arrived. Moments later, six top members of the AA were led away by two Indian officers inside a patch of forest "to greet the leader at the helicopter landing point." Among them were Khing Raza, Saw Tun, and Padu Mulway.

And as soon as the six disappeared into the wood, Indian  securitymen brandished their carbines and ordered the rest to threw up their hands. They did. They had no choice. And as they stood with their hands raised they were blindfolded and their hands tiled bu Indiam soldiers. Minutes past as they stood helplessly on the sands. Then they heard what they thought was the whirr of a sescending chiioer. And the unmistakable sound of gun shots. 

They then never saw the six men again.

WHY are the defense forces stonewalling the CBI investigation? Are these men mere gunrunners "waging war" against India as claimed by the fortress commander in his FIR, or are they indeed members of the Arakan Army who have had closed links with India defense establishment? Did India decide to double cross and liquidate the cream of the Arakanese rebel force to please the Maynamrese junta?

Home secretary B.P Sight has gone on record saying that the India Army had been tipped off about the arms shipments by the Myanmarese authorities. The defense force had, according to him, acted on the basis of that information. But this appears to be a piece of disinformation in the light of the claims made by NUPA in a letter, dated 25 April to India defense minister. 

The letter written by Khin Maung in-charge of foreign affair, NUPA, stated following:

"Those who have been caputed min the incident of Operation Leech on the Andaman Islands on February 11 this year are the members of our organization, NUPA and AA. They are neither armed smugglers nor gunrunners to anti-India N-E rebels. "They are our men carrying our own belongings for our Arakan independence war against the Burmese colonists."

Next, the NUPA goes on to add what it calls three "extraordinary points" that show the India Army's close ties with the AA and expose the India defense establishment's complicity in this so-called gunrunning expedition that was frustrated by Operation Leech.

The India military intelligence officer Col. Grewal had been fully briefed about the 8 February AA expedition on 8 January. Detailed photos of combat and non-combat materials and the list of men who were to be on the broad had also been given to him.

To have army-to-army relationship, Saw Tun, the CEC of NUPA and member of the military committee of AA was assigned as an equivalent of military attaché to deal with the India defense service through Col. Grewal.

SUNDAY is in possession of a copy of this NUPA letter along with lists of AA fighters and the arms involved. There is also the copy of a letter by Khin Raza dated 13 February 1997, authorizing Saw Tun to deal with the India defense authorities.

SUNDAY also spoke to Khin Maung, NUPA's foreign affair in-charge and the writer of the letter. How could he be sure that  Lt-Col  Grewal had been informed about the AA expedition in Thailand in January? " Because I was there,"  said Maung.  "Grewal was in Bangkok between  8a nd 10 January, staying  in a hotel with Saw Tun , discussing the plan ." 

So, what was Grewal doing with Saw Tun, a senior member of AA's military committee in Bangkok? And for that matter, what was he doing with Saw Tun in Delhi  on 5th  February ,six days before the Arakanese rebel leader was to be slain on Landfall ?

SUNDAY sources in Delhi  say Saw was in the capital that day and had met the army officer.    Saw Tun disclose the sources, had left Delhi on the morning of 6th February by an Indian Air Force plane. 

They are unable to say Where Saw Tun went directly from Delhi, but insist that he was to be present at Landfall Inland along with Indian defense personal to receive the Arakanese mission being led by Khaing Raza.
Significantly, the accounts of the detainees do seem to corroborate this piece of information.   

What's more the seizer list accompanying the FIR lodged by the fortress commander is a major giveaway. Among the many things included in the "list of other items" under "Exhibit D" are 50 pieced of Arakan Army vests and 12 pairs of Arakan Army uniform (pant and shirt). Also seizers were "Burma Map/Charts." These materials do seem to suggest very strongly that the men involved were indeed member of the AA.

So what had really happened at Landfall? The vision of A&N Fortress Commodore A.S. Rai and those of the captives vary wildly. Were some of the slain men indeed liaising with India Army for nearly a year as claimed by NUPA? Were six actually killed in encounter as claimed in the FIR or were they shot, as the captives say, after being received and feted as friends? Was Operation Leech convincing victory against international gunrunners or did it amount to human rights violation of the most despicable kind? And why, may we ask, are the defense authorities frustrating the CBI's efforts to investigate?
 Three months have already passed since the incident and the detainees have been given bail, as the CBI failed to produce a charge-sheet within the mandatory 90 days. The captured men have, however, been reasserted on charged of unlawful entry.

Perhaps it is time for the Center to intervene. The country surely deserves to know the truth. The whole truth.